Background
While aspects of the final shape of the post-2015 global development framework have yet to be determined, it is clear that trade will play a major role. Both the May 2013 High Level Panel Report (HLPR) and the July 2014 Outcome Document of the Open Working Group (OWG) on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) rely, to varying degrees, upon increased trade as a vehicle for driving forward the next phase of global development; and both see the successful conclusion of the Doha Round as key, albeit that subtle differences exist between the HLP and the OWG as to what precisely a successful conclusion to the round might constitute.
However, for all of the store held in trade it is not clear that the ambitions laid out in either the HLPR or the Outcome Document and the vehicle chosen for pressing forward that trade-led growth are commensurate with one another. For instance, significant questions exist as to whether: (i) the multilateral trading system led by the World Trade Organization (WTO) can act as a vehicle for substantially opening up trade; (ii) a successful conclusion to the Doha Round can ever be brought about; and (iii) the WTO can serve as an effective partner in pressing for the kind of economic transformation that will produce the greater employment opportunities and more inclusive growth envisaged by both the HLP and the OWG.
This issue of Commonwealth Trade Hot Topics
highlights some fundamental challenges pertaining to the multilateral trading system being an integral part of the post-2015 development agenda to generate the desired impact.
The WTO and the post-2015 development agenda
Since its establishment in 1995 the WTO has yet to oversee the conclusion of a trade round. The closest members came to agreeing a multilateral deal-a provisional agreement concluded at the December 2013 Bali ministerial conference-was thrown into the breach at the end of July 2014 when yet another breakdown in discussions saw members fail to adopt the protocol on trade facilitation. Best guesses now suggest that if the round fails to produce a multilateral outcome, members will accelerate the negotiation of a series Such a piecemeal conclusion to the Doha Round would not be without precedent. Plurilateral agreements were a defining feature of the Tokyo Round accords; and limited-that is, mini-lateralconcession exchanging formed the basis of four of the six bargains concluded prior to Tokyo (see Table  1 ). Indeed, in hindsight it may well be that the Uruguay Round with its universal single undertaking is the anomaly. Yet, the conclusion of a limited agreement that does not bind all members together in a development-focused trade-led growth agenda-precisely what the HLP and the OWG have in mind-would be suboptimal, perhaps deeply so.
Joined up global economic governance
It is not just the seeming inability of the WTO to oversee a successful multilateral trade deal that is problematic, however. It is the lack of any relationship or framework for action between realising globally agreed development goals (e. 
Self-interest and the multilateral trading system
Yet, the problems with the WTO are more than just about the problems members have had in negotiating meaningful trade openings-whether that is because of fundamentally different ideas about what the Doha Round was supposed to accomplish, the difficulties of pursuing greater liberalisation in markets wherein protection has already been significantly removed or where there is little political will (as in agriculture), or the innate complexity and difficulty of negotiating 'behind the border' (i.e. domestic) as opposed to 'at the border' (i.e. traditional point of entry) measures. The organisation is not a technocratic machinery that manages the flow of world trade to the gain of all involved. Rather, it is a fundamentally political institution the character of which is determined by the interactions of its member states. Certainly, the organisation has three other distinct 'personalities': an international bureaucracy comprising a dedicated secretariat; a body of international law and a quasi-juridical apparatus designed to interpret and enforce that law; and a centre-point for a collection of private actors concerned with trade (business groups, law firms, public intellectuals, think tanks and nongovernmental organisations and the like). Yet, it is the nature of the interactions that occur among the member states and the bargains they produce that lend the organisation its essential character.
These interactions are not mere instances of coordination, collaboration and mutual assistance. They are at root adversarial encounters designed to leverage trade advantages that are of greater benefit to domestic rather than foreign interests. This is a somewhat obvious but nonetheless important feature to point out because it helps us see that the WTO is a forum in which competition among member states over trade advantages takes place and wherein the outcome of that competition forms the basis of the way trade is governed globally. It is not, as a result, a forum intrinsically designed to promote trade co-operation for redistributing gains in favour of the poorest.
Why does this matter? It matters because under such circumstances the global trading system will be unlikely to realise the kind of systemic transformations that the HLP and the OWG envisage, among others, to make a major contribution to the elimination of extreme poverty. Pitching member states against one another in strategic games wherein few hard-and-fast rules exist, where all manner of strategies are deployed in pursuit of a deal, and where the bulk of negotiating takes place away from the scrutiny of others, inevitably produces asymmetrical bargains. These bargains, in turn, produce trade opportunities, rules governing the conduct of negotiations, and procedures for the administration of the system that affect all aspects of the system's operation but which inevitably favour the interests of the strongest and most powerful.
Other aspects of the system are undoubtedly important-such as the dispute settlement system, trade policy review mechanism, and the technical and support services offered by the secretariat-but in themselves these are not going to drive forward the kind of trade opportunities the poorest, smallest, and least developed need. It thus remains the case that the primary means of governing global trade and of distributing trade opportunities is through the striking of bargains among 160 members all of which seek at a minimum to maintain their advantages and preferably to extend them.
The consequences of bargaining among unequals
It is worth bearing in mind that organising a system of trade governance in this way has two effects. First, it ensures that negotiations will always be highly contested affairs and exude a propensity towards crisis and collapse. Second, in the absence of a clear preponderance of power, or a capacity to bring members together around specific and shared issues, negotiations will tend towards stasis-as they have in the Doha Round. 2 Understanding that this is a system that generates outcomes and systems of rules that result from contestations between and among members varying dramatically in size, economic significance and negotiating capacity immediately calls into question suggestions that fair and equitable bargains can, or could ever be produced; and that This iterated form of bargaining predictably accentuates the degree to which members are placed at loggerheads with one another. For developing countries, the asymmetry of previous rounds has ensured that they approach any new negotiation seeking to rectify past anomalies (and as time goes by, more determinedly so). While this position has also been the case for a number of industrial countries-as it was for the USA during the Kennedy round vis-à-vis the European Economic Community-their primary position has been one of seeking to protect sectors of decreasing competitiveness and political sensitivity as well as to open up new areas of economic opportunity. The problem is that in approaching a new round those seeking some kind of rectification are encouraged to agree to new concessions in return for remedial action. This is the logic of any bargaining-based system. Yet, it is because of this requirement to offer something in return for that which is received, coupled with existing power inequalities between participating states, that asymmetries in outcome have inevitably been perpetuated and exacerbated in Issue 112 | 2014 | Page 4 successive GATT/WTO rounds. The Uruguay Round is a good example of just this and provides the backdrop to many developing country positions in the Doha Round.
The point here is that the use of exchange as the mechanism of liberalising (and governing) trade among states of vastly different capabilities in institutional confines that have traditionally favoured the industrial states over their developing counterparts has produced bargains that are of dramatically different value to participating states (i.e. they are asymmetrical). As negotiations take place in bursts over time, the inequities of one negotiation influences others; and, as it is only in reciprocating for concessions received that a round can hope to reach a conclusion, it is only through a process of exchange that past anomalies can be redressed. Yet, it is precisely because each exchange is asymmetrical that as negotiations take place the imbalance of commercial opportunities among participating states is exacerbated rather than attenuated. While it may be the case that the least developed are often relieved of the requirement to reciprocate, this itself is not unproblematic precisely because their lack of significance in world trade excludes them from influencing in any way the shape of the negotiations.
The consequence is that one asymmetrical bargain has been produced after another. Yet, it is only when all of the negotiations are taken as a wholethat is, over the lifetime of the institution (and here we need to bear in mind that the WTO is a continuation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT, writ large not a new institutional apparatus with substantively new ways of operating)-that the extent of the asymmetries of economic opportunity between developed and developing members can be appreciated. It is only when viewed in this way that we can appreciate how entrenched the imbalance in the distribution of trade opportunities has become.
Where to from here?
If we are serious about the post-2015 development agenda then we need to begin reforming not just the WTO but also all of the institutions involved in ensuring that, as the HLPR puts it, we 'leave no one behind'. To do so requires a sixth transformation to add to the five that the HLPR outline (see Table 2 ). This transformation requires that we change our global mind-set and acknowledge we are all, as Thomas G Weiss puts it, 'in the same listing boat ', 4 that adversarial forms of business-as-usual governance wherein those that have the greatest and are the most able continue to predominate, while the rest scrabble for what opportunities they can muster are untenable, and that the negotiation of a post-2015 development agenda provides a unique opportunity to reform all of the institutions we have to govern the global economy. If we eschew this task then we will be revisiting the same old questions in our discussions of the post-2030 development agenda, by which point what global economic governance we have will be 15 years older and even more entrenched and harder to reform as a result. More importantly the lives of countless millions will have gone unaffected at a time when we have the resources to make a difference but we choose not to do so. Division of the Commonwealth Secretariat, which is the main intergovernmental agency of the Commonwealth -an association of 53 independent states, comprising large and small, developed and developing, landlocked and island economies -facilitating consultation and co-operation among member governments and countries in the common interest of their peoples and in the promotion of international consensus-building.
ITP is entrusted with the responsibilities of undertaking policy-oriented research and advocacy on trade and development issues and providing informed inputs into the related discourses involving Commonwealth members. The ITP approach is to scan the trade and development landscape for areas where orthodox approaches are ineffective or where there are public policy failures or gaps, and to seek heterodox approaches to address those. Its work plan is flexible to enable quick response to emerging issues in the international trading environment that impact particularly on highly vulnerable Commonwealth constituencies -lease developed countries (LDCs), small states and sub-Saharan Africa.
Scope of ITP Work
ITP undertakes activities principally in three broad areas:
• It supports Commonwealth developing members in their negotiation of multilateral and regional trade agreements that promote development friendly outcomes, notably their economic growth through expanded trade.
• It conducts policy research, consultations and advocacy to increase understanding of the changing international trading environment and of policy options for successful adaptation.
• It contributes to the processes involving the multilateral and bilateral trade regimes that advance more beneficial participation of Commonwealth developing country members, particularly, small states and LDCs and subSaharan Africa. 
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